Frontier reasoning models are produced by posttraining base language models with reinforcement learning. Recent work has challenged this by showing that sampling from a sharpened version of the base model's distribution, a so-called power distribution, elicits comparable reasoning without additional training, curated datasets, or verifiers. However, making this method practical requires efficiently sampling from the power distribution. A sampler needs to "mix" to the power distribution, which necessitates moving between modes of the target distribution; intuitively, e.g., trying different reasoning strategies. The samplers proposed in prior works repeatedly select a "cut" position in the current reasoning trace uniformly at random and resample the suffix from that position onward. However, reasoning traces typically contain a few consequential decisions (e.g., the choice of proof strategy or algorithm), and we observe that a uniformly chosen cut tends to rewrite local details rather than revisit decision points. We introduce an algorithm (Entropy-Cut Metropolis-Hastings) that uses the base model's next-token entropy as a proxy to identify key decision points and resample from those positions. We empirically verify that entropy jumps are a useful proxy for decision points and, in a stylized model of reasoning, prove that our method's mixing time scales with the number of decisions in a trace rather than with the number of tokens, which can be much larger. Across MATH500, HumanEval, GPQA Diamond, and AIME26, our method consistently improves over baselines and RL-trained models.

Coordinate descent methods are popular in machine learning and optimization for their simple sparse updates and excellent practical performance. In the context of large-scale sequential game solving, these same properties would be attractive, but until now no such methods were known, because the strategy spaces do not satisfy the typical separable block structure exploited by such methods. We present the first cyclic coordinate-descent-like method for the polytope of sequence-form strategies, which form the strategy spaces for the players in an extensive-form game (EFG). Our method exploits the recursive structure of the proximal update induced by what are known as dilated regularizers, in order to allow for a pseudo block-wise update. We show that our method enjoys a O(1/T)convergence rate to a two-player zero-sum Nash equilibrium, while avoiding the worst-case polynomial scaling with the number of blocks common to cyclic methods. We empirically show that our algorithm usually performs better than other state-of-the-art first-order methods (i.e., mirror prox), and occasionally can even beat CFR+, a state-ofthe-art algorithm for numerical equilibrium computation in zero-sum EFGs. We then introduce a restarting heuristic for EFG solving. We show empirically that restarting can lead to speedups, sometimes huge, both for our cyclic method, as well as for existing methods such as mirror prox and predictive CFR+.

In this paper, we develop efficient parameterized algorithms for regimes between these two extremes.

We develop a theoretical analysis of LLM-guided formal theorem proving in interactive proof assistants (e.g., Lean) by modeling tactic proposal as a stochastic policy in a finite-horizon deterministic MDP. To capture modern representation learning, we treat the state and action spaces as general compact metric spaces and assume Lipschitz policies. To explain the gap between worst-case hardness and empirical success, we introduce problem distributions generated by a reference policy $q$, including a latent-variable model in which proofs exhibit reusable cut/lemma/sketch structure represented by a proof DAG. Under a top-$k$ search protocol and Tsybakov-type margin conditions, we derive lower bounds on finite-horizon success probability that decompose into search and learning terms, with learning controlled by sequential Rademacher/covering complexity. Our main separation result shows that when cut elimination expands a DAG of depth $D$ into a cut-free tree of size $Ω(Λ^D)$ while the cut-aware hierarchical process has size $O(λ^D)$ with $λ\llΛ$, a flat (cut-free) learner provably requires exponentially more data than a cut-aware hierarchical learner. This provides a principled justification for subgoal decomposition in recent agentic theorem provers.

A common approach for solving BSPPs is by using first-order methods, where local gradient information is used to iteratively improve the solution in order to converge to an equilibrium asymptotically.

The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when all players seek to minimize their internal regret in a repeated normal-form game, the empirical frequency of play converges to a normal-form correlated equilibrium. Extensive-form (that is, tree-form) games generalize normal-form games by modeling both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well as private information. Because of the sequential nature and presence of partial information in the game, extensive-form correlation has significantly different properties than the normal-form counterpart, many of which are still open research directions. Extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as the natural extensive-form counterpart to normal-form correlated equilibrium.