In this paper, we develop efficient parameterized algorithms for regimes between these two extremes.

We develop a theoretical analysis of LLM-guided formal theorem proving in interactive proof assistants (e.g., Lean) by modeling tactic proposal as a stochastic policy in a finite-horizon deterministic MDP. To capture modern representation learning, we treat the state and action spaces as general compact metric spaces and assume Lipschitz policies. To explain the gap between worst-case hardness and empirical success, we introduce problem distributions generated by a reference policy $q$, including a latent-variable model in which proofs exhibit reusable cut/lemma/sketch structure represented by a proof DAG. Under a top-$k$ search protocol and Tsybakov-type margin conditions, we derive lower bounds on finite-horizon success probability that decompose into search and learning terms, with learning controlled by sequential Rademacher/covering complexity. Our main separation result shows that when cut elimination expands a DAG of depth $D$ into a cut-free tree of size $Ω(Λ^D)$ while the cut-aware hierarchical process has size $O(λ^D)$ with $λ\llΛ$, a flat (cut-free) learner provably requires exponentially more data than a cut-aware hierarchical learner. This provides a principled justification for subgoal decomposition in recent agentic theorem provers.

A common approach for solving BSPPs is by using first-order methods, where local gradient information is used to iteratively improve the solution in order to converge to an equilibrium asymptotically.

The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when all players seek to minimize their internal regret in a repeated normal-form game, the empirical frequency of play converges to a normal-form correlated equilibrium. Extensive-form (that is, tree-form) games generalize normal-form games by modeling both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well as private information. Because of the sequential nature and presence of partial information in the game, extensive-form correlation has significantly different properties than the normal-form counterpart, many of which are still open research directions. Extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as the natural extensive-form counterpart to normal-form correlated equilibrium.

Accurately quantifying uncertainty of individual treatment effects (ITEs) across multiple decision points is crucial for personalized decision-making in fields such as healthcare, finance, education, and online marketplaces. Previous work has focused on predicting non-causal longitudinal estimands or constructing prediction bands for ITEs using cross-sectional data based on exchangeability assumptions. We propose a novel method for constructing prediction intervals using conformal inference techniques for time-varying ITEs with weaker assumptions than prior literature. We guarantee a lower bound for coverage, which is dependent on the degree of non-exchangeability in the data. Although our method is broadly applicable across decision-making contexts, we support our theoretical claims with simulations emulating micro-randomized trials (MRTs) -- a sequential experimental design for mobile health (mHealth) studies. We demonstrate the practical utility of our method by applying it to a real-world MRT - the Intern Health Study (IHS).

Furthermore, if the linear model is true, we get very strong performance guarantees.

In addition to yielding predictions, our approach enbles us to provide a per decision point guarantee for the confidence of our predictions.